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NLRB JURISDICTION OVER COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES: A PLEA FOR RULEMAKING
ARTHUR P. MENARD* AND NiCHoLAs DIGIovANNI, JR.**
When the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) first asserted
jurisdiction in 1970 over institutions of higher learning,' faculty un-
ionism was yet a nascent concept.2 Since then, however, the move-
ment has developed significantly,3 although the three major educa-
tional unions recently have suffered some critical defeats.4 While
NLRB doors have been opened to faculty union organization, the
limit of the Board's jurisdiction over colleges and universities re-
mains unclear. Private colleges and universities with gross annual
*B.S., College of the Holy Cross; LL.B., Boston College. Partner, Morgan, Brown, Kearns
& Joy, Boston.
**B.A., Providence College; J.D., Cornell Law School. Associate, Morgan, Brown, Kearns
& Joy, Boston.
1. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
2. The most significant union victory before 1970 was in the City University of New York
(CUNY) system, where elections were held in two separate units in 1968. One election was
won by the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, for a unit of lecturers and teaching
assistants; another, for the full-time industrial unit, was won by the Legislative Conference,
which later merged with the National Education Association. Robert Carr and Daniel Van
Eyck consider the agreements that took effect at CUNY in September 1969 as the starting
point of collective bargaining at four-year institutions, believing the date an agreement is
signed to be more significant than the date a bargaining agent is designated, "especially since
the interval between the two events has, on occasion, been two or more years." R. CAmR & D.
VAN EvcM CoLma=s BAGAwiNG COms To THE Cmipus 17 (1973).
3. In 1968, approximately 10,000 faculty members and other professionals in the United
States were covered by union contracts. By the spring of 1973, the number had soared to
80,000, and the 55,000 professors included in that figure constituted about one-sixth of the
nation's higher education faculty. B. LADD, JR. & S. Lipsnr, PsoFESsos, UNIONs, AND
AmmcAN M-hGHE EDUCATION 2 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Domestic Affairs Study 16, 1973). By June 1972, some 40 four-year institutions had chosen
collective bargaining. R. CARe & D. VAN EYcic, supra note 2, at 54. Only two years later, 133
four-year campuses and 205 two-year institutions had been unionized. CHRONctn OF M- omi
Enuc., June 10, 1974, at 24.
4. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has lost elections at Pace College, Tuscu-
lum College, the University of Minnesota, and others. The National Education Association
(NEA) suffered defeat at nine institutions, including Northern Michigan University. The
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has lost at a number of institutions,
including Syracuse University, Seattle University, Manhattan College, Fordham University,
and Jacksonville University. Additionally, unionization attempts involving two or three un-
ions have been rejected by other major institutions, including the University of Massachu-
setts at Amherst (AAUP-NEA combination), Michigan State University (AAUP and NEA),
New York University (AAUP and AFT-NEA combination), Villanova University (AAUP and
AFT), and the University of Detroit (AAUP and NEA). CHRomCiz or HIoHR EDuc., June
10, 1974, at 24.
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revenues in excess of one million dollars have been brought within
the NLRB's discretionary jurisdiction by a rare exercise of rulemak-
ing authority;' public colleges and universities that are clearly
"political subdivisions" of a state are excluded from NLRB jurisdic-
tion by statute.6 The hazy distinction, however, between "public"
and "private" has created serious jurisdictional uncertainty for in-
stitutions falling somewhere in the penumbrae of these two defini-
tional extremes.
Clarity in this area is unlikely as long as the Board exhibits its
traditional reluctance to use its rulemaking authority. The complex-
ity of the question, which involves numerous public policy factors
as well as statutory interpretation, suggests that rulemaking is the
appropriate vehicle for bringing some predictability to the issue of
when the NLRB can and will assert jurisdiction over educational
institutions. The frequently time-consuming adjudicative process,
which has limited utility for gathering information and opinion and
which must deal with issues in random order, cannot provide the
certainty required to deal with the emerging faculty unionization
movement.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY AND RULE 103.1: NLRB JURISDICTION OVER
PRIVATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
The jurisdictional provision of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)7 empowers the NLRB "to prevent any person from engag-
ing in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting [interstate] com-
merce."8 In Trustees of Columbia University,' legislative history of
statutory limitations upon the Board's jurisdiction, found in the
Act's definition of "employer,""0 formed the basis for the univer-
5. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1974).
6. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
7. Id. §§ 151-68.
8. Id. § 160(a) (1970). For a general discussion of the NLRB's jurisdiction, see SECnON ON
LABOR RELATIONS LAW, AiAnIcAN BAR ASS'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 761-75 (C. Morris
ed. 1970).
9. 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 29 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). The House version of section 2(2) of the amended Act
excluded from the definition of employer virtually all nonprofit organizations. H.R. 3020,80th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1947), in 1 LImLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEiENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947, at 33-34 (N.L.R.B. 1948) [hereinafter cited as IEGISLATIVE HIsTORY]. The Senate
version contained no such exclusion. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1947), in 1
LEGIsLATIvE HIsToRY, supra at 102. The compromise that emerged was an exclusion of "any
corporation or association operating a hospital. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). In 1974 the
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sity's claim that the Board should not assert its jurisdiction over
institutions of higher education." Having found that "the activities
of Columbia University affect[ed] commerce sufficiently to satisfy
the requirements of the statute . . . ,,,12 the Board nevertheless
concluded that nonprofit organizations, even if not exempted ex-
plicitly from statutory NLRB jurisdiction, were intended to be
within the Board's jurisdiction" 'only in exceptional circumstances
and in connection with purely commercial activities of such organi-
zations.' -,3 The Board therefore declined to assert jurisdiction over
Columbia University, 4 providing a longstanding precedent for ques-
tions of jurisdiction over educational institutions.1 5
Almost twenty years after Columbia, however, the Board took
cognizance of a changed economic pattern of higher education in the
United States when it reconsidered its position on jurisdiction over
hospital exclusion was removed from section 2(2). Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360,
88 Stat. 395, amending 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
11. 97 N.L.R.B. at 426-27, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099. The petitioning union argued that the
limited scope of the final exclusion in section 2(2) indicated a congressional intent to exempt
only charitable hospitals and no other nonprofit organizations from the Board's jurisdiction.
Id. at 427, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099.
12. Id. at 425, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1098. The Board determined that Columbia did affect
commerce sufficiently to come within its jurisdictional standards:
During the academic year ended June 30, 1950, Columbia University had a
direct inflow of $52,000 (10.5 percent of the standard established by Federal
Dairy Co., Inc., 91 NLRB 638) and an indirect inflow of $584,000 (58A percent
of the standard established by Doam's House of Miracles, Inc., 91 NLRB 632).
During the same period, it also had a direct outflow of $4,890 from the sale of
photostats, microfilms, and the Germanic and Romanic Reviews (19 percent of
the standard established by Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Company,
Limited, 91 NLRB 618) and an indirect outflow of $21,150 from the sale of radio
and television rights to its football games (42.3 percent of the standard estab-
lished by Hollow Tree Lumber Company, 91 N.L.R.B. 635). . . . In addition,
Columbia University does a substantial amount of classified contract work for
defense agencies . ..
Id. at 425 n.2, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1098 n.2.
13. Id. at 427, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099, quoting H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1947), in 1 LEisrn r HIsroRy, supra note 10, at 536.
14. The Board concluded: "Under all the circumstances, we do not believe that it would
effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert its jurisdiction over a nonprofit,
educational institution where the activities involved are noncommercial in nature and inti-
mately connected with the charitable purposes and educational activities of the institution."
97 N.L.R.B. at 427, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1099.
15. Columbia was followed in Iowa State Memorial Union, 55 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1964)
(NLRB administrative decision); Crotty Bros., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 755, 55 L.R.R.M. 1402
(1964); University of Miami, 146 N.L.R.B. 1448, 56 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964).
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colleges and universities in Cornell University,6 dealing with the
rights of bargaining units at Syracuse and Cornell Universities. By
1970, higher education had become big business: enrollment had
increased dramatically with corresponding increases in the operat-
ing budgets of educational institutions, thereby enlarging greatly
their impact on interstate commerce." Because Cornell and Syra-
cuse, like Columbia, were private universities, the Board's power to
assert jurisdiction was not challenged. Nevertheless, when deciding
whether, in its discretion, to assert that jurisdiction, the Board ex-
pressly overruled Columbia."' The Board examined the statutory
foundation of Columbia and congressional action since that time,
divining no legislative intent to put nonprofit employers beyond the
Board's reach. 9 Coupled with the markedly increased economic
impact of colleges and universities, the absence of a statutory man-
date not to expand the Board's discretionary jurisdiction impelled
16. 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970). See generally Note, The NLRB's Assertion
of Jurisdiction over Universities, 32 U. Pnar. L. REv. 416 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Jurisdiction ouer Universities].
17. In Cornell, the Board recognized the far-reaching effects of higher education on the
economy:
[T]he approximately 1,450 private 4- and 2-year colleges and universities in the
United States have on their payrolls some 247,000 full-time professionals and
263,000 full- and part-time nonprofessional employees. Operating budgets of
private educational facilities were an estimated $6 billion in 1969, an increase
of $300 million over the previous fiscal year. Income is derived not only from
the traditional sources, such as tuition and gifts, but from the purely commer-
cial avenues of securities investments and real estate holdings. Revenues of
private institutions of higher education for fiscal year 1966-67 totaled over $6
billion. More than $1.5 billion of that sum came from Government appropria-
tions. Private colleges and universities also realized a commercial profit of
$70,678,000 from furnishing housing and food services.
183 N.L.R.B. at 332, 74 L.R.M. at 1273 (footnotes omitted). After analyzing other aspects
of the changes in higher education since Columbia, the Board stated: "lit is no longer
sufficient to say that merely because employees are in a nonprofit sector of the economy, the
operations of their employers do not substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. at 333, 74
L.R.R.M. at 1273.
18. 183 N.L.R.B. at 334, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1275.
19. Not only did the Board find unpersuasive the legislative history relied upon in
Columbia, but it refused to interpret congressional silence on the issue of nonprofit employers
during later amendments to the Act as an indication that such employers were to be ex-
empted from NLRB jurisdiction. Id. at 331, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1271-72. Moreover, the enactment
in 1959 of section 14(c), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1970), which specifically regulated the Board's
exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction while permitting the states to fill the voids left by
the Board's refusals to assert jurisdiction, "manifest[ed] a congressional policy favoring such
assertion where the Board finds that the operations of a class of employers exercise a substan-
tial effect on commerce." Id. at 332, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1272.
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the NLRB to retreat from its position in Columbia."0 Yet the Board
declined in Cornell "to establish jurisdictional standards for non-
profit colleges and universities as a class. . ., leav[ing] the devel-
opment of an appropriate jurisdictional standard for subsequent
adjudication." 21
The Board did not await "subsequent adjudication" to establish
the standards, however; departing from a traditionaIl reluctance to
use its rulemaking powers,2 the Board promulgated rule 103.1:
The Board will assert its jurisdiction in any proceeding arising
under sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Act involving any private
nonprofit college or university which has a gross annual revenue
from all sources (excluding only contributions which, because of
limitation by the grantor, are not available for use for operating
expenses) of not less than $1 million.?
The Board observed that this rule would bring approximately 80
percent of all private colleges and universities and approximately 95
percent of all full- and part-time nonprofessional personnel under
its umbrella.2 The rule clarified one of the questions left open by
Cornell 2s by establishing a definite dollar amount to determine the
20. The Board indicated that state labor relations laws did not provide adequate forums
in most states to regulate the burgeoning campus unionization movement and concluded
"that assertion of jurisdiction is required over those private colleges and universities whose
operations have a substantial effect on commerce to insure the orderly, effective, and uniform
application of the national labor policy." Id. at 334, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1274-75.
21. Id. at 334, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1275.
22. Section 6 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970), provides: "The Board shall have
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this [Act]." See Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
Although not questioning its power to make substantive rules, the Board, until 1970, had
never issued such a rule. K. DAvis, ADmNISTRAT LAw TExr § 6.08, at 152 (3d ed. 1972).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1974).
24. One week after the rule took effect, Boston College became the first institution to be
found to be within its scope. Boston College, 187 N.L.R.B. 133, 75 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1970).
25. The Board's jurisdictional rule announced in Cornell recently was challenged in the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in NLRB v. Wentworth Institute & Wentworth College
of Technology, Inc., No. 74-1219 (1st Cir., Mar. 31, 1975). The employer in Wentworth
attacked the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over it by relying upon the same legislative
history that had induced the Board in Columbia to withhold jurisdiction, id. at 6-9, while
also contending that NLRB jurisdiction, when faculty unionization is involved, exceeded
congressional intent, id. at 9-10. These contentions, however, along with a claim that the
Board's only proper approach to assertion of jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institu-
tions would be by rulemaking, were rejected by the court of appeals. Id. at 10. The court held
that the Board did have jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institutions, id., and rejected
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point at which the impact of private nonprofit colleges and universi-
ties upon interstate commerce would be deemed sufficient to war-
rant NLRB jurisdiction. But other questions remained, concerning,
for example, the meaning of "private nonprofit college or univer-
sity" and the jurisdictional status of other institutions not clearly
within this definition. As an effort to delimit more clearly the
Board's power, the rule had the perhaps unintended effect of raising
other difficult jurisdictional issues.
PRIVATE, PUBLIC, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN
Though American colleges and universities traditionally have
been grouped into two apparently simple general categories, public
and private, placement of a particular institution into one of these
two groups may be difficult. As society, has grown in size and com-
plexity the line between public and private sectors of the economy
has blurred almost beyond recognition. Government involvement in
private industry and commerce has led to intricate organizations in
which financing is a blend of the public tax dollar and the entrepre-
neur's investment. Many educational institutions, originally cre-
ated by private endowments and investments, now rely heavily
upon public support such as government aid-to-education pro-
grams, public loans for students, and government contracts; many
state colleges and universities no longer are controlled tightly by the
state but operate essentially as private institutions. It has become
more appropriate, therefore, to assign colleges and universities to
the school's further arguments that college faculty should not be included as "employees"
under the Act, id. at 10-14.
The Board's decision to assert jurisdiction over private nonprofit colleges led to the often
difficult problem of applying to educational institutions the law and precedents developed
for the industrial sector. Problems that on their face seemed elementary, such as whether a
faculty member is an "employee," spawned philosophical discussions and difficult decisions.
See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639,79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B.
134, 78 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971); C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77
L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971). The Board has addressed the status of department chairmen as super-
visors within the meaning of the Act, see, e.g., University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 87
L.R.R.M. 1634 (1974); Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 83 L.R.R.M. 1373, 1375 (1973);
considered the multicampus university and appropriate units therein, Fairleigh Dickinson
Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No.'101, 84 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1973); and departed from its usual practice
of including regular part-time employees in the same unit with full-time employees, separat-
ing part-time faculty members from full-time members by relying upon such distinctly aca-
demic criteria as participation in institutional governance and eligibility for tenure, New York
Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973).
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three, rather than two, general categories: those that are clearly
private, those that are clearly public, and those that may be termed
either quasi-private or quasi-public. Significantly, the category to
which a particular institution is assigned may be determinative of
NLRB jurisdiction.
A school financed exclusively by private funds and subject to no
significant governmental control of internal management clearly
should be classified "private." Jurisdictional determination for a
clearly private school is made relatively easy by rule 103.1, which
invokes NLRB jurisdiction for any "private nonprofit college or uni-
versity which has a gross annual revenue from all sources. . . of not
less than $1 million."26 In contrast, an educational institution that
receives all or most of its funding from governmental sources and is
managed internally by people responsible to the government clearly
should be classified "public." Section 2(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) excludes from the definition of an "em-
ployer," over whom the Board may assert jurisdiction, "any State
or political subdivision thereof. ... 2 The Board usually has ex-
26. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1974). Literal interpretation of the rule would require satisfaction
of four tests: the institution must be "private," "nonprofit," a "college or university," and
have annual revenue of at least one million dollars. Assuming a clearly private school, the
"nonprofit" hurdle should not be substantial because it appears that the term serves a
clarifying, rather than a restrictive, purpose. In Columbia, the Board reasoned that the
drafters of the NLRA intended to exempt from NLRB jurisdiction nonprofit organizations
engaged in activities not purely commercial in nature. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427, 29 L.R.R.M. at
1099. In Cornell, the Board expanded Columbia's rationale regarding nonprofit organizations
to encompass even noncommercial institutions such as private colleges and universities; there
is no indication, however, that a school otherwise within the scope of rule 103.1 would be
excluded from NLRB jurisdiction because it is a profitmaking institution. But cf. Jurisdiction
over Universities, supra note 16, at 422. Indeed, a profitmaking school would have no basis
to seek exemption under any possible interpretation of the statutory limit upon the Board's
regulatory powers over nonprofit institutions that was interpreted in Columbia and Cornell.
Moreover, realization of a commercial profit in certain operations of an institution the pri-
mary purpose of which is education may not remove it froom NLRB jurisdiction under Cornell
and rule 103.1. See id. at 422, 428.
The question of whether a school is a "college or university" has not yet been at issue, and
the dollar amount thus appears to be the most significant jurisdictional prerequisite for a
clearly private school. If the dollar amount is not satisfied, the NLRB should refuse jurisdic-
tion. Compare Judson School, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 86 L.R.R.M. 1248 (1974) (jurisdiction
asserted over corporation operating a private school where corporation had annual gross
revenue exceeding one million dollars), with Children's Communities, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. No.
5, 86 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1974) (jurisdiction denied where employer's gross income was $348,000),
and Ming Quong Children's Center, 210 N.L.R.B. No. 125,86 LR.R.M. 1254 (1974) (jurisdic-
tion declined where total anticipated annual income was $532,411).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, 194 N.L.R.B. 371, 372, 78
L.R.R.M. 1609, 1610 (1971).
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amined two factors to determine whether an entity is a political
subdivision of a state: the entity must "either be (1) created directly
by the State, so as to constitute a department or administrative arm
of government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsi-
ble to public officials or to the general public."' ' Thus, any clearly
public institution, created by the state or administered by individu-
als responsible to public officials or to the general public, should be
exempt from NLRB jurisdiction under section 2(2) of the NLRA.
The applicability of the Board's discretionary jurisdiction thus
should not become an issue.
28. See also NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600 (1971); Oxnard Harbor Dist.,
34 N.L.R.B. 1285, 9 L.R.R.M. 73 (1941); Mobil S.S. Ass'n, 8 N.L.R.B. 1297, 3 L.R.R.M. 226
(1938). In NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Diet., supra, the Supreme Court affirmed an appellate
court finding that a nonprofit utility district in Tennessee was a political subdivision of the
state and that it was, therefore, exempt from NLRB jurisdiction. The Court found several
factors crucial. First, the district was created and organized under the Utility District Law
of 1937, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2601 to -2636 (Repl. Vol. 1971), and any district incorpo-
rated under this statute was declared to be a "'municipality' or public corporation... a
body politic and corporate." Id. § 6-2607. Second, such districts had the power of eminent
domain, which could be exercised against other governmental entities. Additionally, the
records of all district proceedings were declared to be "public records," and the property and
revenue of a district were exempt from all state, county, and municipal taxes, as was income
from its bonds. 402 U.S. at 602, 606-07.
In Children's Village, Inc. 197 N.L.R.B. 1218, 80 L.R.R.M. 1747 (1972), the Board refused
to assert jurisdiction over a New York school district, finding it to be a subdivision of the
State of New York and noting that the district was created by the New York legislature. The
state controlled the hiring, certification, and tenure of school district teachers, established
all rules and regulations regarding discipline, and prescribed books and courses. The Board
similarly refused to assert jurisdiction in Fayetteville-Lincoln County Elec. Sys., 183
N.L.R.B. 101, 74 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1970), finding that an electrical distribution system was a
political subdivision and hence not a statutory "employer." The system had been created by
state legislation, and members of the "board of utilities," the system's governing body ulti-
mately responsible for day-to-day administration, were appointees of an elected official. See
also NLRB v. Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Diet., 469 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1972); City of Austell
Natural Gas Sys., 186 N.L.R.B. 280, 75 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1970); New Bedford S.S. Authority,
127 N.L.R.B. 1322, 46 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1960).
In Ohio Inns, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 84 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1973), the Board found itself to be
without jurisdiction over a lodge in a state-owned park because substantial state control of
the lodge's operations and labor relations demonstrated that the state was at least a joint
employer. The exemption was not based upon the "political subdivision" provision, however,
but upon the exemption of the "State" as an employer. See note 27 supra & accompanying
text.
When a quasi-public entity has been found to be an employer and not a political subdivi-
sion, the same criteria of state creation and control have been dispositive. See NLRB v.
Randolph Elec. Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine
Arts; supra. See also NLRB v. Natchez Trace Elec. Power Ass'n, 476 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.
1973); Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist., 186 N.L.R.B. 827, 75 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1970); Hotel
& Restaurant Employees Union, 153 N.L.R.B. 392, 59 L.R.R.M. 1488 (1965).
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Many educational institutions, however, cannot be classified
clearly as public or private, and such schools may find it difficult
to determine whether the Board can or will assert jurisdiction over
them. If not a political subdivision, a school seemingly would be
within jurisdictional guidelines established by Cornell and rule
103.1; nevertheless, several NLRB decisions subsequent to Cornell
indicate that the inquiry does not stop here, for even when the
political subdivision exclusion has not barred jurisdiction, the
Board has been reluctant to bring under its control labor disputes
at institutions with substantial governmental connections. An ex-
amination of these decisions will illustrate the uncertainty
generated, creating a need for definitive rulemaking.
Can the NLRB Assert Jurisdiction?
When considering a school that is neither clearly public nor
clearly private, the initial determination should be whether the in-
stitution is -a political subdivision. Two recent cases indicate that,
despite the refined standards that have evolved regarding this issue,
this question can be difficult.
In Temple University,"0 a union had sought to organize a group
of employees at Temple University in Philadelphia, but the school's
unique nature presented jurisdictional difficulties for the NLRB.
Originally chartered as a private, nonprofit college, Temple Univer-
sity had been absorbed into the Pennsylvania higher education sys-
tem in 1965 by the Temple University-Commonwealth Act,3" which
modified the university's original charter and vested in the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, through the Governor and the legisla-
ture, substantial control over the university's affairs. Although
Temple remained a private, nonprofit university, the Board found
that the Act had made Temple a "State-related university. ' '31 Sev-
eral provisions of the Temple University-Commonwealth Act per-
suaded the Board not to assert jurisdiction, including the Act's
stated purpose of extending higher education opportunities to Penn-
sylvania residents, regulation of the composition of the Board of
29. 194 N.L.R.B. 1160, 79 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1972).
30. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 24, §§ 2510-1 to -12 (Supp. 1974).
31. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1160, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1197. The Board stated: "Although the Univer-
sity is in form a private, nonprofit institution, it is apparent that the 1965 statute established
the University as a quasi-public higher educational institution to provide low cost higher
education for Commonwealth residents." Id. at 1161, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
1975]
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Trustees, a requirement that residents be charged less tuition and
fees than nonresidents, inclusion of the university's annual budget
request in the Commonwealth's overall budget, and requirements
for reporting to the state auditor and the legislature on financial
affairs and to the Governor and legislature on all university activi-
ties.32 The Board also noted that in 1972 the state government con-
tributed approximately two-thirds of the university's unrestricted
revenue, and that since 1965 Pennsylvania had spent $40 million on
physical plant improvements and had appropriated an additional
$79 million for future capital improvements. 3 Furthermore, the
state government retained title to the land and buildings provided
and did not charge rent to the university. Declining to assert juris-
diction because of Temple's close association with the state, the
Board nevertheless did not hold that the university was within the
per se "state or political subdivision" exception, but rested its deci-
sion upon its discretionary jurisdiction. 5 Temple, it was reasoned,
had a "unique relationship" with the state that made inappropriate
the assertion of jurisdiction," effectively carving out an exception to
the jurisdictional standards of rule 103.1 but neglecting to articulate
the relationship, if any, between the exception and the statutory
political subdivision exclusion. That this neglect bred confusion is
evidenced by later activity concerning another hybrid private-
public institution, the University of Vermont.3
The American Federatior of Teachers (AFT) had been organizing
actively in Vermont for some time, and in 1973 had defeated two
other unions to acquire representation rights for faculty members
and certain librarians in state colleges. The principal target, the
32. Id. at 1160-61, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
33. Id. at 1160, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1197. The state's share of Temple's operating income had
risen from 37.8 percent in 1965. Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
34. Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
35. Id. at 1161, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198. The university had conceded that it did not fit within
the political subdivision exclusion. By accepting that admission, the Board indicated that
an "instrumentality" over which the state exercises direct and extensive control is not merely
by virtue of statutory language and state control a "political subdivision" outside the Board's
jurisdiction.
36. Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
37. Morgan, Brown, Kearns & Joy currently serve as labor relations counsel to the Univer-
sity of Vermont.
38. This unionization was accomplished under a provision of the Vermont State Employees




University of Vermont (UVM) was chartered as a private, nonprofit
university in 179111 and retained that status, with minor modifica-
tions, until 19550 when it was united with Vermont Agricultural
College under the name "University of Vermont and State Agricul-
tural College."41 Despite statutory language directing that the re-
sulting school "be recognized and utilized as an instrumentality of
the state for providing public higher education .. ,,12 the legisla-
ture did not provide for direct or extensive state control; conse-
quently the state exercised only minimal control over the affairs of
the university.
Although nine of the twenty-three members of the Board of Trus-
tees are appointed by the legislature and three are appointed by the
Governor, who also serves as an ex officio member, the Board is not
answerable to the state for its actions nor can members be removed
by the state. In the year ending June 30, 1973, state appropriations
of $10.5 million accounted for only approximately 23 percent of total
revenues of $45.4 million, and the state did not regulate fees, faculty
salaries, standards for admission, or tuition, except to require that
Vermont residents be charged a maximum of 40 percent of the non-
resident tuition.'3 The university was not required to submit a line
budget to the legislature, and most new construction and renovation
was financed by the university through bonds, long-term notes, and
government loans and subsidies.
All land and buildings remained the property of the university,
and rental properties, such as those for faculty and married student
housing, were subject to local property taxes. Although the univer-
sity's educational buildings were exempt from state taxation, as
were all such college facilities under Vermofit law, the university
was required to remit state income and sales taxes for some of its
operations. Unlike other state agencies, the university was subject
to municipal building permit requirements. Furthermore, the presi-
dent and trustees retained complete authority to convey, mortgage,
rent, or assign the school's property, and to collect income there-
from.
39. Charter of University of Vermont, Nov. 3, 1'791 (not included in revision and compila-
tion of state statutes).
40. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2281-2362 (1968), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2282(b), 2282a (Supp. 1974).
41. No. 66, [1955] Vt. Acts 57.
42. Id.
43. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2282(b) (1968).
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On May 24, 1974, the AFT filed charges against UVM with the
NLRB, alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA.' 1 On June 12 the Regional Director dismissed the petition,
stating in a letter to the parties: "It does not appear that further
proceedings on the charge are warranted inasmuch as the University
of Vermont, respondent herein, is an instrumentality of the State
of Vermont, hence not an 'employer' under Sec. 2(2) of the Act. Cf.
Temple University, 194 NLRB 1160. I am, therefore, refusing to
issue a complaint in this matter." 5 Both the union and the em-
ployer, however, deeming NLRB jurisdiction preferable to that of
the state board, appealed this decision to the Board's General Coun-
sel. The parties questioned the strength of the nexus between the
state and the university that had been relied upon to withhold juris-
diction. Moreover, the university noted that the regional director
had used the term "instrumentality" of the state, while the Act, in
section 2(2), excludes "any State or political subdivision thereof."4
On August 22, 1974, the General Counsel sustained the parties'
appeal in a brief letter." The case was remanded to the Regional
Director for investigation of the merits of the substantive charges,
but the lack of any subsequent challenge to the Board's jurisdiction
has precluded further enlightenment on the jurisdictional issue.
The arguably errant interpretation of Temple by the Regional
Director in his initial refusal to assert jurisdiction raises serious
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (2) (1970). In general, the charges centered on alleged discrimi-
nation by the university against the AFT in favor of the American Association of University
Professors in the use of college facilities.
45. Letter from Robert S. Fuchs, Regional Director, to John Dewey Federation of UVM,
AFT, Local 3203, AFL-CIO, June 12, 1974.
46. See note 27 supra & accompanying text. An examination of legislative history reveals
that the term "instrumentality" was not to be equated with "political subdivision," as the
latter term was used in the Act. Following the congressional debate on the Taft-Hartley
amendments in 1947, the final changes in the Act were discussed in the House Conference
Report, which received the approval of both houses of Congress. The report, discussing section
2(2), focused on the exclusion of "wholly owned Government corporations" from the statutory
definition of "employer": "In the case of instrumentalities of the United States, the confer-
ence agreement limits the exclusion to wholly owned Government corporations and to Federal
Reserve Banks.. . ." H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist. Sess. 32 (1947), in 1 LEGISLATrvE
HiSRY, supra note 10, at 536 (emphasis supplied). Relying upon this statement, the univer-
sity asserted that "instrumentality" was used to designate wholly owned federal corporations
and that, if an exemption did exist for "instrumentalities" of a state, it sh6uld be limited to
wholly owned state corporations, which clearly would not encompass the University of Ver-
mont.
47. Letter from Peter G. Nash, NLRB General Counsel, to David A. Jenkins, Aug. 22,1974.
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questions concerning the Board's treatment of quasi-public institu-
tions of higher education. Although Temple was not based upon the
statutory political subdivision exemption of section 2(2), but upon
discretionary grounds, the Regional Director stated that-the Univer-
sity of Vermont was not an employer within the meaning of that
section. The original exclusion of all private colleges and universi-
ties from NLRB jurisdiction announced in Columbia also was based
upon an interpretation of section 2(2), as was the Board's reversal
in Cornell. Undoubtedly, therefore, reliance upon that section of the
statute when dealing with schools such as Temple and UVM is not
incorrect; failure to articulate whether reliance is placed upon the
political subdivision exemption or upon more general discretionary
concepts of jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations, as refined in
Columbia, Cornell, and rule 103.1, however, might allow an unwar-
ranted expansion of the political subdivision exception as it has
developed in other contexts.
Application of the traditional political subdivision tests to the
facts presented by the litigation concerning Temple University and
the University of Vermont dispels any doubt about whether this
statutory standard should apply. Neither Temple nor UVM could
be said to have been created directly by the state; both schools,
formerly private institutions, underwent charter modifications, with
UVM even receiving a new name, but because both retained signifi-
cant private aspects, this metamorphosis was incomplete. Legisla-
tion may have modified the operations of both schools, but it did
not create them, although the formation of a new combined corpo-
rate entity from two formerly independent schools arguably was a
"creation" of the new University of Vermont and State Agricultural
College. The degree of state administrative control in each case,
although significant in many respects, also does not appear to sat-
isfy political subdivision standards. Only one-third of Temple's
Board of Trustees were to be appointed by state officials, for exam-
ple, and although a majority of UVM's trustees were state ap-
pointed, they were not subject to removal by the state nor were they
responsible directly to the state for their actions.
Extended analysis of the political subdivision question, even if
the results were more satisfying, would not be warranted. Notwith-
standing any implication that the Regional Director may have relied
upon this statutory exemption when refusing to consider the charges
against UVM, Temple was not premised upon this provision. It is
evident that the Board is developing a new exception to the broad
1975]
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exercise of its discretionary powers in Cornell and rule 103.1. A
further look at this exception therefore is necessary.
Will the NLRB Assert Jurisdiction?
A school not so clearly public that it is within the political subdi-
vision exclusion and not so clearly private that it is "private" within
the meaning of rule 103.1 faces uncertainty when determining
whether its labor relations activities are regulated by federal stan-
dards. Rule 103.1 answered one difficult question by announcing a
monetary jurisdictional limitation,48 thereby obviating a need to
make a potentially troublesome determination about a school's
impact on commerce. Undefined standards remain, foremost among
them being the descriptive term "private." That the contradis-
tinction between "private" and "political subdivision" does not end
the inquiry can be seen in the Board's analysis in Temple: although
the school was "a 'State-related university in the higher education
system of the Commonwealth'" and an " 'instrumentality' of the
Commonwealth," 9 it was not a political subdivision of Pennsyl-
vania;" nevertheless, the Board found such a "unique relationship"
between the school and the state that it deemed the university to
be a "quasi-public" institution, leading to the ruling that "it would
not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over the
University.""
48. See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
49. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1161, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
50. Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
51. Id., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198. Soon after Temple the Board, in Queens Borough Public
Library, 195 N.L.R.B. 974, 79 L.R.R.M. 1561 (1972), applied the rationale of Temple in a
different context by refusing to assert jurisdiction over a library because of its close relation-
ship with the City of New York. Several important factors were noted: all trustees of the
library were appointed by the mayor, and their removal from office was subject to mayoral
approval; the trustees controlled the expenditure of all money appropriated by the city for
the maintenance of the library, and the annual library budget had to be submitted for city
approval; money required for salaries and operating expenses was provided by the city out of
tax revenue; library employees were paid in accordance with the salary schedules for city
employees; the library had to comply with the 1969-1970 job freeze imposed by the city; the
city supplied more than 80 percent of the library's operating income with the balance supplied
by the federal government and the State of NewYork; and title to all library buildings, books,
and furniture remained in the city. The Board reasoned: "In Temple University we concluded
that because of the 'unique relationship' between the University and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, we would decline to assert jurisdiction. In the instant proceeding, the nexus
between the Library and the city of New York is as close, if not closer, for without city support
the Library would cease to exist." Id. at 975, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1562.
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In Howard University,52 concerning a school with close ties to the
federal, rather than a state, government, the Board declined to as-
sert jurisdiction because of the university's "unique relationship
with the Federal Government. .... "3 Chartered by Congress in
1867, Howard University had received federal funds since 1928
through annual congressional appropriations. The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) inspected the school an-
nually and controlled dispensation of federal funds. Howard was
subjected to audits by several federal agencies, and, although it held
title to its land and buildings, the federal government paid all con-
struction costs, while regularly providing more than 50 percent of
the total academic budget. Nonfaculty employees were classified on
federal government wage scales. Analyzing these and other factors, 4
the Board declined to assert its discretionary jurisdiction, stating:
The Federal Government's interest in Howard's financial affairs
far exceeds, in degree, that normally associated with the Gov-
ernment's customary funding of specific university projects, and
is uniquely characterized by the involvement of several Federal
Agencies at several levels .... [Congressional] statutory re-
quirements for inspection and access to Howard's financial re-
cords, budgets, accounts, and its physical facilities variously
delegate lines of authority to a number of officials of [the Office
of Budget and Management], HEW, and [the General Ac-
counting Office] among others ....
.. . We are persuaded, further, that, because of that unique
relationship, effective use of the collective-bargaining process by
the University and its employees in the manner and for purposes
contemplated by the Act would entail the involvement of many
Federal Agencies-entities over which we, of course, have no
jurisdiction ....
Temple and Howard strongly suggest that governmental involve-
ment with a private educational institution, although insufficient to
make the institution a political subdivision, may create a "unique
relationship" that leads the NLRB, in its discretion, to withhold
jurisdiction. It remains unclear whether schools so excluded from
52. 211 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 86 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974).
53. Id. at.., 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391.
54. Id. at., 86 L.R.R.M. at 1389-91.
55. Id. at , 86 L.R.R.M. at 1390-91.
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federal coverage properly should be categorized as "private," "pub-
lic," or something else.58 Regardless of nomenclature, however, the
problem remains: what degree of governmental involvement is nec-
essary to exclude a school from NLRB jurisdiction?57 In its first
venture into the area of substantive rulemaking, the Board removed
a significant barrier to effective application of its decision in Cornell
by delineating clearly the requisite impact upon interstate com-
merce that justifies federal intervention into educational institu-
tions' labor disputes; the need for further rulemaking to prescribe
the limits of the term "private" in rule 103.1 is no less compelling.
THE NEED FOR Rumo
General Benefits of NLRB Rulemaking
Administrative agencies such as the NLRB can develop the law
either by quasi-legislative rulemaking or by ad hoc adjudication.
The NLRB, though expressly granted rulemaking authority in sec-
tion 6 of the National Labor Relations Act,- declined for many years
to exercise this power. Instead, a yearly report summarizing the
previous year's case-law developments was published .5 Thus the
Board relied exclusively upon adjudication, indulging in adjudica-
tive rulemaking while pretending not to be making rules at all." In
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.," the Supreme Court upheld the
Board's insistence upon satisfaction by an employer of a standard
of disclosure in Board elections that had been announced in an
earlier case. 2 The Court indicated, however, that in some cases
56. In Temple, the Board stated: "Although the University is in form a private, nonprofit
institution, it is apparent.. . that the 1965 statute established the University as a quasi.
public higher educational institution . " 194 N.L.R.B. at 1161, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1198
(emphasis supplied).
57. As Members Fanning and Penello, dissenting in Howard, observed, "the exception for
'special circumstances' is about to outdistance the rule for general applicability." 211
N.L.R.B. at -, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391.
58. See note 22 supra. Moreover, Professor Davis submits that the authority to make rules
is implied whenever any officer has discretionary power. K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 6.04, at
143.
59. See K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 6.08, at 153.
60. Id. See also Peck, The Atrophied Rule-making Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
61. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). See generally Silverman, The Case for the National Labor Rela-
tions Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction, 25 LAB. L.J. 607 (1974).
62. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966).
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rulemaking rather than adjudication might be required.6 This ad-
monishment apparently motivated the Board to reevaluate its for-
mer approach to rulemaking:6 one year after Wyman-Gordon, the
Board used its rulemaking power for the first time in formulating
rule 103.1,65 and it since has engaged in substantive rulemaking on
two other occasions. 6
Rulemaking, rather than adjudication, has been espoused for sit-
uations in which numerous parties potentially are affectea by the
administrative- lawmaking process for at least four basic reasons.6 7
First, in the NLRB adjudication procedure, although the Board
often solicits amicus curiae briefs from a few eminent sources, rele-
vant information may be excluded. 8 Conversely, in the very open
rulemaking procedure all interested parties are invited to partici-
pate by supplying information, and tentative rules are published for
reaction by interested parties.69 Second, the adjudicative procedure
63. 394 U.S. at 764; see Silverman, supra note 61, at 609. Speaking for a plurality of four,
Justice Fortas approved the substance of the Board's disclosfire rule, while criticizing the
procedure by which it had been promulgated: "The rule-making provisions of... [the
Administrative Procedure] Act. . .were designed to assure fairness and mature considera-
tion of rules of general application. . . . They may not be avoided by the process of making
rules in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. There is no warrant in law for the Board to
replace the statutory scheme with a rule-making procedure of its own invention." 394 U.S.
at 764. Justice Douglas, dissenting, noted that "an agency is not adjudicating when it is
making a rule to fit future cases." Id. at 777. Also dissenting, Justice Harlan contrasted the
proper functions of adjudication and rulemaking, remarking: "lit is precisely in these
situations, in which established patterns of conduct are revolutionized, that rule-making
procedures perform [their] vital functions . . . " Id. at 780-81. See also NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 94 S. Ct. 1757, 1771 ("Tlhere may be situations where
the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of
the Act ... .").
64. K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 6.08, at 154.
65. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1974); see note 23 supra & accompanying text.
66. In August 1972 the Board requested comments regarding possible assertion of jurisdic-
tion over symphony orchestras, 37 Fed. Reg. 16813 (1972), and upon responses to this publica-
tion, jurisdiction was asserted over those orchestras with a gross annual revenue of at least
one million dollars, 38 Fed. Reg. 6176-77 (1972). The Board also sought comments regarding
the dog- and horse-racing industries, 37 Fed. Reg. 14242 (1972), but decided not to extend
jurisdiction, 38 Fed. Reg. 9507 (1973).
67. K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 6.03, at 142; Silverman, supra note 61, at 610.
68. Silverman, supra note 61, at 610. The Board, before deciding Cornell, received 28 amici
curiae briefs, 16 favoring and 12 against assertion of jurisdiction. In addition, a resolution was
passed in October 1969 by the National Association of State Labor Relations Agencies re-
questing the Board to maintain its private college exemption. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B.
329 n.l, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1270 n.1 (1970). Yet such participation may not provide needed
background data. See Silverman, supra note 61, at 610-11.
69. K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 6.03, at 142; Silverman, supra note 61, at 610.
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results in the haphazard development of a body of law because
issues cannot be addressed in a logically constructed order; further-
more, parties to adjudication may be represented by counsel of une-
qual ability, may litigate without an awareness of larger questions
involved, and may overemphasize past doctrine that possibly is
inconsistent with present social needs and employer and employee
concerns.70 Rulemaking, by contrast, permits flexible consideration
of both broad and narrow issues in an appropriately defined con-
text." Third, a standard created through rulemaking can be applied
more fairly than can one created through adjudication because rules
operate prospectively, while adjudication generally is retroactive. 72
Finally, rulemaking enables an agency to initiate its own policies
whenever it deems such action appropriate, rather than awaiting an
appropriate case.7
As considerations of public policy weigh more heavily in the de-
velopment of administrative law standards, the advantages of rule-
making increase. Professor Davis has observed: "When more than
a handful of parties are affected, creation of new law through...
administrative rulemaking is much more desirable than . ..
through. . . administrative adjudication."74 Public policy depends
upon shifting conditions in society that cannot be understood pro-
perly without examining a wide range of information and view-
points. Adjudication, in which the debate often is focused on a
single, narrow issue, rarely provides the needed background. The
applicability of these principles to the question of NLRB jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes at institutions of higher education is clear;
presumably, the Board recognized the importance of public policy
considerations when it promulgated rule 103.1. Equally substantial
policy factors engulf the question of whether, and to what extent,
70. Silverman, supra note 61, at 610. For example, when Cornell was decided, reliance
upon the policy considerations underlying Columbia was inappropriate, as the impact of
colleges upon interstate commerce had increased dramatically during the intervening years.
See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
71. K. DAviS, supra note 22, § 6.03, at 142. If Temple University, for example, had antici-
pated the Board's "unique relationship" rationale, much time and expense might have been
saved.
72. K. DAVIS, supra note 22, § 6.03.
73. Silverman, supra note 61, at 610. If an exception for state-related private colleges
inevitably was to be engrafted onto the Board's jurisdictional guidelines, encompassing it in
the original rule would have eliminated the need for the perplexing litigation following
Cornell.
74. K. DAVIs, supra note 22, § 6.03, at 142.
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the Board should limit its regulation of quasi-public schools.
Moreover, the jurisdictional question takes on greater significance
when the unique characteristics of faculty unionism are considered.
Jurisdiction over State-Related Colleges and Universities-
A Question of Public Policy
One factor that undoubtedly has made the NLPB reluctant to
step into college labor disputes when the school has significant gov-
ernmental ties is the potential for intergovernmental or intragovern-
mental conflict. This potential was recognized but not clearly relied
upon in Temple when the Board noted the possible coverage of
Temple's employees under Pennsylvania's public employee labor
relations statute.75 More precisely stated was the Board's observa-
tion in Howard that to assert jurisdiction would involve "many
Federal Agencies-entities over which we, of course, have no juris-
diction."7 6 That serious difficulties could result from inappropriate
NLRB intervention into labor disputes involving state or federal
agencies is evidenced by the explicit statutory exclusions provided
for those agencies in section 2(2) of the NLRA. Inappropriate with-
holding of jurisdiction also has its costs, the foremost of which is the
creation of a "no-man's land" in which neither federal nor state
regulation of labor disputes is afforded. 77 Adequate evaluation of the
75. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1161, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
76. 211 N.L.R.B. at-, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1391. The unique degree of federal involvement
with Howard University was not overlooked by the Board, which stated that the school
"enjoys a unique relationship with the Federal Government unmatched by any other univer-
sity to which our discretionary jurisdictional yardsticks apply." Id. at , 86 L.R.R.M. at
1391.
77. In their dissent in Howard, Members Fanning and Penello noted that if the Board
improperly declines to enter a dispute that also is not subject to regulation by a state agency,
an area is created without effective governmental labor relations supervision. Id. at-, 86
L.R.R.M. at 1392. Pointing out that such an approach is inconsistent with the Board's
position in Cornell (see 183 N.L.R.B. at 331, 333-34, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1274-75), they concluded:
What has been created here is a permanent no-man's land ....
In Cornell we changed our policy regarding the assertion of jurisdiction over
private universities, realizing that increased Federal financial involvement was
a significant factor favoring assertion. Now the majority declines jurisdiction
because the Federal involvement is too substantial. We think the Cornell ap-
proach is the right one, and, except in situations where the Government is in
effective control of the conduct of labor relations as spelled out in prior deci-
sions, we would follow it.
211 N.L.RB. at _- 86 L.R.R.M. at 1392 (footnotes omitted).
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multifarious types of governmental involvement in higher educa-
tion7s and the possible effects of such involvement upon labor rela-
tions can be made only in a rulemaking proceeding not confined by
the precise facts of a particular school.
Other policy considerations, primarily stemming from the nar-
rower issue of faculty unionism, also point towards rulemaking as
the proper means to establish jurisdictional guidelines. One argu-
ment against assertion of jurisdiction by the Board over public or
quasi-public educational institutions is that faculty members, de-
nied the right to strike under the labor relations laws of most
states," would be granted that right under the NLRA, thereby inter-
fering with the state's performance of its governmental function and
indicating employee disloyalty to the sovereign." Although this ar-
gument may have merit when applied to police, firefighters, or even
elementary and high school teachers, it is less persuasive when ap-
plied to college professors whose services may be less essential than
those of more typical state employees. Furthermore, a very real
issue of academic freedom is raised by denying teachers the ability
to protect by economic sanction their right to freedom of expres-
sion.8
78. See generally Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 63 (1973).
79. See, e.g., MICH Comp. LAWS ANN. § 423.202 (1967) ("No person holding a position...
in the government of the state of Michigan, or in the government of any 1 or more of the
political subdivisions thereof ... or in any other branch of the public service, hereinafter
called a 'public employee,' shall strike."). Most states, by statute or common law, prohibit
public employee strikes. At the American Bar Association's Labor Relations Section meeting
in August 1974, Bernard F. Ashe, general counsel of the New York State United Teachers
"noted that the right to strike is almost uniformly denied to public sector workers, and only
six states - Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont - allow strikes
under certain conditions." 87 LAB. REL. REP. 76 (Sept. 16, 1974). See also ABA Colm. ON
STATE LABoR LAw AND PuBLic EMPLOYEE BARGmAmN, REPORT (1973) in [2 Reference File]
Gov'T EMPL. RE. REP. 61:201 (1974); 466 Gov'T EipL. REL. REP. B-6 (Aug. 21, 1972). For a
summary of state labor laws governing public employees, see [1 Reference File] Gov'T EMPL.
REL. RaP. 51:501 (1973).
80. See Brown, Professors and Unions, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 252, 308 (1970).
81. One court has held, even in the face of strong antistrike legislation, that to enjoin a
strike by professors aimed at protecting their freedom of expression the state must show
violence, irreparable injury, or breach of peace. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 38 Mich.
314, 326, 157 N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968).
There is also a pragmatic question regarding the effectiveness of antistrike legislation. The
instances of teacher strikes undeterred by such legislation are legion. One example is the
longest teacher strike in United States history in the Timberland, New Hampshire, School
District, which began in the winter of 1973-74 and still continues.
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Other policy considerations support assertion of jurisdiction.
Many states have no legislation guaranteeing the organizational
rights of faculty, and even when such legislation exists, it often
provides no exclusion for "supervisors."82 Thus department chair-
men, division directors, or deans, included in the bargaining unit
under state law, may find that their own interests conflict with their
duty to act on behalf of the administration. Moreover, the principal
purposes of the NLRA apply to the issues presented by faculty
unionism and institutions of higher education in general: states can-
not, or at least have not, dealt adequately or uniformly with labor
disputes, while large public and quasi-public educational institu-
tions, engaged in and affecting interstate commerce, should operate
under uniform and harmonious national labor policies. s3
CONCLUSION
Important public policy considerations pervade the issues raised
by NLRB assertion of, or refusal to assert, jurisdiction over colleges
and universities. Because of the large number of parties directly
involved, including the general public, rulemaking, not adjudica-
tion, is the appropriate mechanism for decisionmaking. The neces-
sary input for such a decision can come only from the broad variety
of sources that can be activated by a rulemaking proceeding; cases
since Cornell demonstrate the inherent deficiencies of adjudication
when far-reaching policy factors are at play in the administrative
lawmaking process. The ability of rulemaking to define the re-
quisite impact upon commerce in rule 103.1 should signal the pro-
priety of rulemaking for determining which schools, because of their
governmental connections, will be excluded from NLRB jurisdic-
tion.
82. For example, the Vermont State Employees Labor Relations Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
3, §§ 901-1007 (1972), which covers the faculties of the Vermont state colleges, has no such
exclusion. This exclusion is provided by the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
83. See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 333-34, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1274-75 (1970). The
increasingly complex problem of campus unionism possibly can be dealt with more ade-
quately by a national labor forum that has, since Cornell, begun to resolve some of the thorny
questions endemic to the college environment. See note 25 supra. More limited exposure to
these questions on the state level might retard proper development of the law in this area.
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